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Preventive Detention, Character Evidence, and the New Criminal Law
Abstract
A new criminal law has emerged in the last quarter century. The dominant goal of the new criminal law is
preventive detention-incarceration to incapacitate dangerous persons. The emergence of the new criminal law
has remade both sentencing law and definitions of crimes themselves. The new criminal law has also begun to
remake the law of evidence. As incapacitation has become an accepted goal of criminal punishment, the
rationale of the character rule has become less compelling, and the rule itself has begun to wane in criminal
practice. These changes have been subtle, but they have also been both radical and fairly rapid. There is no
indication that the law will reverse course. Indeed, the law's response to the threat of terrorism has only
accelerated the move toward the new criminal law. In coming years, the Supreme Court will be forced to
address a variety of difficult constitutional questions that the new criminal law presents. Ironically, the safest
solution may be to embrace preventive detention as an accepted function of the criminal law. Doing so would
alter the Supreme Court doctrines which distinguish the civil from the criminal-doctrines that limit the reach
of the Bill of Rights. The procedural protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights should be extended to more
citizens faced with incarceration regardless of whether the purpose of incarceration is incapacitation rather
than punishment or deterrence. As the new criminal law remakes the American justice system, the Court must
recognize that preventive detention is now a core function of the criminal law. That recognition will have the
counterintuitive effect of expanding the constitutional protections given to citizens facing imprisonment.
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PREVENTIVE DETENTION, CHARACTER EVIDENCE, 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The criminal law is changing in a profound way. Anglo-American criminal 
law has traditionally focused on deterring and punishing discrete acts of 
misconduct. In the last few decades, however, American criminal law has shifted 
its focus from deviant acts to dangerous individuals. Incapacitation, which once 
played only a peripheral role in the criminal law, has moved to center stage. To a 
substantial extent, it has supplanted the two formerly dominant theories of 
punishment—deterrence and retribution. This dramatic change has been noted, 
often with some dread, by both legal scholars1 and sociologists.2 
The shift toward preventive detention has also begun to remake the law of 
criminal evidence. As the criminal law increasingly focuses on the characteristics 
of the offender rather than the characteristics of the offense, evidence law is 
bending to allow juries access to more information about a defendant’s personality 
and personal history, especially his or her criminal history. In other words, as the 
criminal law focuses increasingly on the incapacitation of dangerous individuals 
rather than the deterrence and punishment of dangerous acts, the character 
evidence rule is giving way. While evidence scholars have noted the decline in the 
character evidence rule for some time,3 they have typically explained the decline 
by reference to competing personality theories in psychology. But the true reason 
for the decline has less to do with any shifts in prevailing personality theories than 
                                                 
* © 2010 Ted Sampsell-Jones, Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College 
of Law. Thanks to David Fontana and Gregory Duhl for their comments on earlier drafts. 
Thanks to Craig Smith and Jenna Yauch for their research assistance. 
1 See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995); 
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, 
The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121 (2005). 
2 See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE 
AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993); Malcolm M. Feeley & 
Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and 
Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992). 
3 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character 
Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The 
Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 423 (2006); Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes 
and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461, 512 n.176 (1996); 
Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 2437, 2467–70 (2000). 
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it does with the more fundamental shift in the substantive criminal law—the shift 
toward preventive detention.4  
These changes in the criminal law and the law of evidence have important 
constitutional implications. In coming years, courts will likely be faced with 
increasing constitutional challenges to both substantive laws aimed at preventive 
detention and evidence rules used to admit character evidence. These challenges, 
which will necessarily be grounded in the slippery world of substantive due 
process, are unlikely to gain much traction. For both criminal and civil forms of 
detention, the Supreme Court has held that detention may not be based on 
dangerousness alone—some additional finding is required.5 But this 
“dangerousness plus” formulation has been easily evaded by legislatures, and there 
is no realistic way to stop the evasions. Constitutional law does not, and cannot, 
impose meaningful substantive limits on the state’s ability to incapacitate 
dangerous individuals. 
But the shift toward preventive detention in the criminal law will force the 
Supreme Court to reconsider what procedural protections are required when 
incapacitation is the basis for incarceration. In the past, the Supreme Court has 
attempted to define a line between criminal and civil laws that depends on 
maintaining the traditional theories of punishment.6 The Court has suggested that 
criminal law is paradigmatically about deterrence and punishment, while 
preventive detention is civil in nature.7 But as criminal law has embraced and 
absorbed the function of preventive detention, the Court’s distinction has come to 
seem increasingly fictional. Its jurisprudence in the area has already been 
destabilized, and the foundation will erode further in the coming years. The Court 
should allow the façade to fall.8 
Jack Balkin recently discussed the rise of the “National Surveillance State,” 
largely in the context of the federal government’s war on terrorism.9 He argued 
that the rise of the National Surveillance State poses several dangers: first, “that 
                                                 
4 See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (holding that an individual 
found not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be confined unless they are both (1) mentally 
ill and (2) dangerous); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962) (holding that 
criminal punishments cannot be imposed for mere status or involuntary acts). 
6 See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the 
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 819 (1997); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with 
Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 
81–82 (1996). 
7 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 
364, 368–69 (1986). 
8 Somewhat ironically, the increasing use of preventive detention in criminal law 
means that those subject to detention currently deemed “civil” would be entitled to greater 
procedural protections—the same protections that criminal defendants are afforded. 
9 Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (2008). 
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government will create a parallel track of preventative law enforcement that routes 
around the traditional guarantees of the Bill of Rights,” and second, “that 
traditional law enforcement and social services will increasingly resemble the 
parallel track.”10 In fact, both issues have been developing in American criminal 
law for a quarter century, and have only been accelerated by the war on terrorism. 
Once rejected as incompatible with American norms of criminal justice, 
preventive detention is now becoming an accepted feature of the criminal law.11 Its 
acceptance has changed both the substantive criminal law and the law of evidence. 
In light of this trend, is time for the Supreme Court to recognize the change and 
alter its jurisprudence accordingly. 
 
II.  THE RISE OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE DECLINE 
OF THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULE 
 
 Over the last several decades, the theory animating American criminal law 
has changed dramatically. The “traditional” rationales of retribution and deterrence 
have given way to incapacitation.12 That underlying conceptual shift has produced 
myriad concrete reforms in the substantive criminal law and the law of evidence.  
 
A.  Preventive Detention in the Substantive Criminal Law 
 
The use of preventive detention has grown in both criminal and quasi-criminal 
legal systems. In quasi-criminal systems, which are currently denominated “civil” 
by the Supreme Court,13 American law has recently developed or expanded legal 
institutions that employ preventive detention openly. The most widely used of 
these is the system of civil commitments for sexual offenders, which often result in 
the incarceration of an offender after he has completed his criminal sentence.14 To 
some extent, the civil commitment system resembles the older systems of 
institutionalization of the mentally ill.15 But civil commitments of sex offenders 
                                                 
10 Id. at 15–16. 
11 Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–
3 (2003); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention 
as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (“[D]uring the past several 
decades, the justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past crimes to preventing 
future violations through the incarceration and control of dangerous offenders.”). 
12 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 32–34; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 3. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See generally United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (concluding that 
Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to create a federal civil 
commitment regime); ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL 
PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE (2006).  
15 Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective of the “Sex Psychopath” Statute: From the 
Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897 (1995). 
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resemble criminal punishment in that incarceration is usually dependent on some 
initial finding of criminal liability and offenders are typically detained in prison.16 
Some jurisdictions also use short-term preventive detention for cases of 
domestic violence.17 As with civil commitments, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of such systems.18 Finally, and most recently, the federal 
government has begun the creation of a system of preventive detention for 
suspected and potential terrorists.19 The Supreme Court has held the indefinite 
preventive detention of citizens labeled as enemy combatants is lawful, although it 
also found that due process requires procedural safeguards for this type of 
incapacitation to be constitutional.20 
But even within the criminal law proper, where preventive detention is less 
openly espoused, there are several areas where the theory of selective 
incapacitation has reshaped the law. First and foremost, incapacitation has 
reshaped sentencing.21 To a substantial and increasing extent, the length of a 
defendant’s sentence is a function of his criminal history rather than being solely 
dependent on his discrete offense.22 
Nearly all American jurisdictions now have some form of a “Three Strikes” 
sentencing law.23 These laws have exploded in popularity in the last two decades.24 
A jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction list of statutes is attached as Appendix A. These 
                                                 
16 Peter C. Pfaffenroth, The Need for Coherence: States’ Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2229, 2239–42 (2003). 
17 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-6.3 (2009); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (2008). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
19 Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1881 (2004); Yung Tin, 
Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for 
Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 
155–56 (2005) (proposing a noncriminal system of detention analogous to procedures for 
pretrial detention for dangerousness, quarantine, and civil commitment). 
20 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
21 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 96; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Andrew 
Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 98 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010) (“Because most criminal defendants plead guilty rather than proceeding to trial, 
sentencing has become the most important judicial phase of the criminal justice system for 
determining the punishment a defendant will receive.”). 
22 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (2009); see also Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1110–11 (“At sentencing, prior convictions are not only considered relevant to determine 
the proper punishment, but are treated as one of the most important pieces of sentencing 
information.”). 
23 See infra Appendix A. 
24 Almost two-thirds of the “Three Strikes” laws have been passed since 1990. See 
generally infra Appendix A; Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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laws, many of which were passed during the 1990s,25 impose punishments based 
primarily on criminal history rather than the present offense.26 Many such laws 
impose massive punishments even where the present offense is relatively minor.27 
In such cases, lengthy incarceration is said to be justified not by any need to punish 
or deter the offense, but rather by the need to incapacitate the offender.28 
Even where special recidivism statutes do not apply, sentencing is largely a 
function of criminal history.29 Guideline systems, first used in the 1980s, rely 
heavily on criminal history scores in setting punishment.30 Since they were first 
enacted, some have been amended to make criminal history weigh even more 
heavily. And in more indeterminate sentencing systems, a judge’s sentencing 
discretion is often guided by some sort of parole department report, which tends to 
rely heavily on criminal history in making recommendations.31 Criminal history 
functions mostly as a proxy for dangerousness, on the assumption that past 
behavior is a good predictor of future criminality.32 The emphasis on criminal 
history in sentencing reflects the growing influence of incapacitation rationales.33 
                                                 
25 For an older overview of legislative changes during the 1990s, see John Clark et al., 
“Three Strikes and You’re Out”: A Review of State Legislation, NAT’L INST. JUST.: RES. 
BRIEF (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2007, at 
1, 9–10, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165369.pdf. 
26 For instance in Vermont, judges have the discretion to sentence a defendant to life 
in prison upon a third felony conviction for a crime of violence when the defendant has two 
previous violent crime convictions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1995). In Connecticut 
judges look for “persistent dangerous felony offender[s]” for application of their three 
strikes law. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-40 (2008). 
27 See generally Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (sentencing defendant to 
two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for stealing $150 worth of video tapes); 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (sentencing defendant to a term of twenty-five 
years to life for stealing three golf clubs from a country club).  
28 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001) (noting that California’s Three Strikes 
law was justified both by arguments of incapacitation and deterrence). 
29 See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996); 1 RESEARCH ON 
SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 83–87 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983). 
30 See Markus D. Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. 
REV. 689, 711 (1995); Michael E. O’Neill, Abraham’s Legacy: An Empirical Assessment 
of (Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 305 n.52 
(2001); see generally Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing 
Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 303 (1997).  
31 See generally Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933 (1995). 
32 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1193, 1216 (1985); Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical 
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 590–91 (2003). 
33 See Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation: Criminal 
Justice’s Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 675–76 (2004) (arguing that while 
many academics disparage incapacitation, “[i]t is appropriate to impose a sentence on an 
offender convicted of a serious crime based on a risk of serious future victimization”). 
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Prison release practices also reflect, even more obviously, a focus on selective 
incapacitation and preventive detention. The use of parole-based systems has 
declined dramatically in American law,34 but actual release dates remain flexible, 
and partly discretionary, in some jurisdictions.35 Officials may release some 
prisoners but not others, and in making that choice, they attempt to release those 
least likely to re-offend. Once again, predictions are often mostly based on a 
prisoner’s criminal history.36 Once again, past acts justify preventive detention. 
The increased focus on recidivism has affected not just the institutions that 
determine the extent of liability, but also those that determine the initial fact of 
liability. Aside from the deterioration of the character evidence rule, there are other 
ways that offender-based information has infiltrated criminal trials. 
Substantive criminal statutes increasingly define liability, in part, based on a 
defendant’s past. Traditionally there have been some crimes based in part on a 
criminal’s past status—such as crimes for felons possessing firearms.37 More 
recently, however, legislatures have created novel crimes based partly on history or 
patterns of behavior. In the late 1990s, federal homicide laws were amended to 
define a new species of murder: homicide after a pattern of child abuse.38 Several 
states have followed suit, and more are considering doing the same.39 Some 
jurisdictions created similar provisions for homicides involving a past pattern of 
domestic abuse.40 
Child abuse, domestic abuse, and elder abuse statutes themselves often define 
crimes not simply in terms of discrete acts, but rather in terms of repeated patterns 
of behavior.41 In recent years, such statutes have been passed or amended to 
increase penalties. Prosecution of such crimes involves evidence not just of a 
single discrete crime but also of some history of behavior.42 It thus invites, or even 
requires, the jury to focus more on the defendant and his personality than on a 
single instance of conduct. 
                                                 
34 KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 1–2 (1998); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State 
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1360 (2008).  
35 See generally Jennifer M. McKinney, Washington State’s Return to Indeterminate 
Sentencing for Sex Offenses: Correcting Past Sentencing Mistakes and Preventing Future 
Harm, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 309 (2002) (discussing Washington’s use of indeterminate 
sentencing and preventive detention for sex offenders). 
36 See HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 47–76 (discussing how criminal history scores 
came to play an increasing role in parole decisions). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
38 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). 
39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 633(a)(2) (1999); MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(5) 
(2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(c)(A) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.055 (1987); 
see also S.B. 1093, 106th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2009). 
40 MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(6). 
41 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (2009). 
42 See, e.g., People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 417 (2009) (discussing “course of 
conduct” crimes such as child abuse). 
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Finally, new norms of preventive detention have also altered traditional 
concepts of excuse and responsibility. Traditionally, the criminal law excused the 
acts of some defendants, such as children and the insane, who lacked full adult 
mental capacities.43 Punishment was withheld because such offenders were 
nondeterrable and undeserving of the moral condemnation that attends 
retribution.44 But even if deterrence and retribution cannot justify incarceration of 
subadult offenders, incapacitation can. And as the criminal law has embraced 
incapacitation, it has also expanded to cover more of the deviants who were 
formerly in separate legal systems—systems designed solely for juveniles and the 
mentally ill. In the last few decades, nearly all American jurisdictions have 
expanded criminal liability for juvenile offenders,45 and many have also narrowed 
or abolished the insanity defense.46 
These changes all demonstrate the increasing extent to which incapacitation is 
a primary theory animating the criminal law.47 Of course, the case should not be 
overstated. Incapacitation has always played some role, and the traditionally 
dominant theories of deterrence and retribution still play an important role today. 
But in the last few decades, incapacitation has risen dramatically in importance, 
and its ascendance continues. 
                                                 
43 See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (1987). 
44 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 160–62 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); H.L.A. HART, Legal 
Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 41–43 (1968). 
45 See BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 189–244 (1999); PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE 
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, at xii (1996), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf; Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the 
Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 722–25 (1991); see generally DEAN J. CHAMPION & 
G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991); Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to 
Criminal Court: Policy Goals, Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 IDAHO 
L. REV. 173 (1994); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court Abolitionists Can Learn From the 
Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 577.  
46 HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING 
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 13–15, 149–50 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline 
Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear 
of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1376–77 (1997); see Act 
of Mar. 14, 1996, ch. 225, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 737, 737 (codified at IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-207 (2004)); Act of May 13, 1995, ch. 251, § 20, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 1187, 
1213–14 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2007)); Act of May 17, 1991, ch. 800, § 
150, 1991 Mont. Laws 3011, 3074 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2009)); 
Act of Feb. 4, 1999, ch. 2, § 1, 1999 Utah Laws 2, 2 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
305 (2004)). 
47 It is now routine for modern commentators to refer to incapacitation as one of 
several (typically four) primary theories of punishment. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence 
Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1543–44 (2009). 
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One possible reason for its rise relates to the decline of institutions for the 
mentally ill. As Bernard Harcourt has shown, while the American prison 
population rose dramatically in the late twentieth century, the overall level of 
forced confinement remained fairly stable.48 The prison population rose, in other 
words, as the mental institution population fell. To some extent, the criminal 
justice system was forced to take in the class of people who were formerly handled 
by the mental health system.49 The criminal law adapted to this change by shifting 
its focus to incapacitation. 
Another possible reason relates to the resurgence of trait theory and related 
social science. The theory behind actuarial methods of punishment had its origins 
in the Progressive Era of the 1920s, and it experienced a massive resurgence in the 
late twentieth century.50 As Harcourt says, the use of actuarial methods rose 
exponentially.51 These changes were fueled in part by a new body of social science 
research suggesting that crime could be reduced by employing new methods to 
predict future criminality.52 Whatever the underlying reasons, the political demand 
for increased use of preventive detention of dangerous persons has produced a 
variety of legal reforms that have altered the shape of the criminal justice system. 
 
B.  The Decline of the Character Evidence Rule 
 
The rise of preventive detention has also begun to alter one of the most 
fundamental features of criminal evidence law: the character evidence rule.53 As 
incapacitation has risen in prominence, the character evidence rule has declined. 
The story of its decline is by no means straightforward, in part because the 
character evidence rule has a long and somewhat confused history in criminal 
trials.54 Its rationale has shifted over time, and its acceptance by judges has ebbed 
and flowed. It is not the case that there was, at any point, a golden age where the 
                                                 
48 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 166–68. 
49 Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their 
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 157–58, 
202 (2000) (identifying a direct relationship between the closing of mental institutions over 
the last forty years and the corresponding increase of the mentally ill in the prison 
population). 
50 Susan Marlene Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment 
of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 513–16 (1991). 
51 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 16, 77. 
52 See Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of Dangerousness, 
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 409 (2001). 
53 The rule, which dates back several centuries, is now codified in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404 and similar state rules.  
54 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 190–203 
(2003); Colin Miller, Impeachable Offenses?: Why Civil Parties in Quasi-Criminal Cases 
Should Be Treated Like Criminal Defendants Under the Felony Impeachment Rule, 36 
PEPP. L. REV. 997, 1002–04 (2009); Thomas J. Reed, Trial By Propensity: Admission of 
Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 716–18 
(1981). 
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character evidence rule was either well-understood or rigorously enforced.55 The 
story of its decline has no straightforward linear narrative. 
Nonetheless, the recent history is a history of decline.56 Legislatures have 
created several new exceptions to the rule, and judges have interpreted the rule in a 
way that allows the admission of a great deal of character evidence. Evidence law 
scholars have noted the rule’s decline, and a few have even called for its outright 
repeal.57 During the Reagan administration, the Department of Justice also called 
for its abolition.58 While proposals for total repeal have gained little traction, the 
rule has been besieged by a series of smaller, incremental acts of reform. 
The most obvious of the recent narrowing reforms are the explicit exceptions 
for sex cases. In 1994, Congress circumvented the normal rulemaking process to 
add Rules 413, 414, and 415, which allow character evidence against defendants in 
cases of sexual assault and child molestation.59 Despite the objections of academic 
commentators, several states—including California—followed suit.60 More states 
are considering similar exceptions; for instance, Alaska and California have also 
                                                 
55 See Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 
HARV. L. REV. 988, 988–89, 1033–34 (1938) (discussing the inconsistencies in then-
current doctrine of the character evidence rule). 
56 See Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive Behavior 
and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 74 n.31 (2008) (noting the ongoing 
erosion of the character prohibition); Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 423 (“Paradoxically, in 
the past decade, the tables have turned. The character evidence prohibition is no longer 
considered sacrosanct.”); Mosteller, supra note 3, at 512 n.176 (“We may have seen the 
beginning of the end of the character rules as they have been understood for most of this 
nation’s history.”); Swift, supra note 3, at 2468–71 (discussing various doctrines that have 
loosened the strictures of the character prohibition). 
57 David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and 
Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 35 (1994); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character 
Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1547, 1620–26 (1998); H. Richard Uviller, 
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 890 (1982) (“[C]haracter evidence cannot and should not be 
banished from the field of proof.”). 
58 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE 
ADMISSION OF CRIMINAL HISTORIES AT TRIAL: ‘TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE’ REPORT NO. 
4 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 709–10 (1989); William P. Barr, 
“Combating Violent Crime: 24 Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice”: 
Recommendations for State Criminal Justice Systems, 51 CRIM. L. REP. 2315, 2326 (1992) 
(noting that the Attorney General’s Recommendation 13 suggested ways to “[r]eform 
evidentiary rules to enhance the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial”). 
59 See FED. R. EVID. 413–15 (enacted as part of Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135–37 
(1994)). 
60 ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1420 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-103 (Supp. 
2007); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404(2)(b) (West Supp. 
2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7.3 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 
(LexisNexis 1998); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 412.2 (2006); ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2)–
(3). 
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created similar exceptions for cases of domestic violence.61 In addition, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence have been amended to limit the scope of the character 
prohibition. In 2000, Rule 404(a)(1) was amended to provide that when a 
defendant attacks a victim’s character, the prosecution may respond with an attack 
on the defendant’s character.62  
In addition to the explicit limitations created by legislatures, courts have 
weakened the character evidence rules in several less obvious ways. First, the 
growing acceptance of syndrome evidence has allowed a sort of backdoor entry for 
character evidence.63 When the jury hears evidence that an accuser may suffer 
from Battered Women’s Syndrome, for example, it is only a small inferential leap 
to the conclusion that the defendant has committed not just the charged act but also 
a series of past crimes. Syndrome evidence was once widely excluded, but in the 
last two decades, courts have begun to admit it freely.64 Along with syndrome 
evidence, some courts have even begun to admit profile evidence, which is in 
essence the flip side of the same coin.65 
Second, liberal interpretations of Rule 609(a)(1) have led to the widespread 
admission of prior crimes for impeachment.66 When it was passed, Rule 609(a)(1) 
was a compromise between extreme positions of categorical admission and 
categorical exclusion of prior felonies—the rule sought to admit some and exclude 
others based on a probative-prejudice balancing test.67 In practice, however, courts 
have tilted the scale in favor of admission.68 Of course, in theory, such evidence is 
admitted only to show character for truthfulness and not to show other character 
traits,69 but it is doubtful that juries are able to cabin relevance in the way that the 
rule demands.70 
                                                 
61 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (West 2009); ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(4). 
62 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note. 
63 See Mosteller, supra note 3, at 463–65 (discussing how certain uses of syndrome 
evidence are essentially “group character” evidence). 
64 See id. at 486–91 (discussing the recent trends toward admissibility of syndrome 
evidence, especially Battered Women’s Syndrome evidence). 
65 See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 587 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
the admission of child molester profile evidence against the defendant). 
66 See Jeffrey Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the 
Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
289, 293 (2008). 
67 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 186 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
(“The Federal Rule governing impeachment by proof of conviction of crime is the product 
of compromise.”). 
68 See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A 
Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 10, 12 
(1999); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 
404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 145, 196–200 (1989). 
69 United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.). 
70 H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing 
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 790–92 (1993); see also CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.29, at 492 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the 
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Third, and most importantly, courts have accepted expansive interpretations 
of the “other purposes” doctrines of Rule 404(b).71 To be sure, the line between the 
impermissible propensity inference and other permissible inferences has always 
been hazy, to say the least.72 Prior to the enactment of the rules, courts often 
interpreted the “other purposes” doctrines broadly to admit evidence of prior 
crimes.73 Since the passage of the rules, however, courts have expanded those 
doctrines of admissibility even further, and thus contracted the basic rule of 
exclusion. Courts have, for example, expanded the plan doctrine to adopt what 
Professor Imwinkelried has called the “unlinked act” theory.74 In 1994, reversing a 
previous ruling, the California Supreme Court effectively adopted the unlinked 
plan theory.75 Several other states have done the same. Courts have also revived 
the “doctrine of chances” to admit evidence of other crimes to show a defendant’s 
mental state.76 
For these reasons and others, evidence scholars generally agree that the 
character evidence rule is declining.77 But there is less agreement, or even 
discussion, about the reason for its decline. The simple answer would be to say that 
courts and legislatures find the rationale for the character evidence rule less 
compelling than they once did. But that answer begs the question: which rationale? 
When the character evidence rule developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, it was justified primarily by concerns of notice and surprise.78 With the 
development of modern pleading and discovery standards, however, those 
concerns largely evaporated. The rule, in a sense, went searching for a new 
                                                                                                                            
difficulties with Rule 609 impeachment and relevancy); Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock 
and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4, 9 (1997) (same); Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on 
Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on 
Trial Outcomes 4–7 (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 07-012, 2007), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=998529 (summarizing social science literature demonstrating 
that jurors routinely misuse Rule 609 evidence as general propensity evidence rather than 
just evidence on truthfulness). 
71 See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with 
Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 228, 233–34, 248 (2005); Susan Stuart, Evidentiary 
Use of Other Crime Evidence: A Survey of Recent Trends in Criminal Procedure, 20 IND. 
L. REV. 183, 197–98 (1987); Swift, supra note 3, at 2470–71 (2000). 
72 See Ordover, supra note 68, at 135–36; Stone, supra note 55, at 1005–06. 
73 See M.C. Slough & J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. 
REV. 325, 327 (1956), cited in FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note. 
74 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 3:24 (2006) 
(criticizing the “unlinked act” doctrine). 
75 Miguel A. Méndez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California 
Supreme Court’s About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s 
Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 479, 490–92 (1995). 
76 Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 422–23. 
77 See id. at 423.  
78 LANGBEIN, supra note 54, at 190–91 (2003). 
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rationale.79 It found two: (1) the risk that juries would overweigh the propensity 
inference, and (2) the risk that juries would engage in preventive detention.80 
The Supreme Court described the two modern rationales in Old Chief v. 
United States: 
 
Such improper grounds certainly include the one that [the defendant] 
points to here: generalizing a defendant’s earlier bad act into bad 
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act 
now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he 
should happen to be innocent momentarily). As then-Judge Breyer put it, 
“Although . . . ‘propensity evidence’ is relevant, the risk that a jury will 
convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it 
will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates 
a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”81 
 
The two modern rationales are related but still quite distinct. The propensity 
rationale is based on a concern that juries will find the defendant guilty of the 
discrete charged act, but that they will do so relying too heavily on the inference 
that because he did something bad in the past, he probably did this as well. The 
preventive detention rationale, by contrast, is based on a concern that juries will 
return a guilty verdict in order to incapacitate the defendant regardless of whether 
he actually committed the discrete charged act. As Roger Park explained, the 
former concern is that juries will find guilt for the wrong reasons, while the latter 
concern is that jurors will convict without actually finding guilt.82 
Most debates about the normative validity of the character evidence rule focus 
on the propensity rationale. These debates are often informed by personality 
theories drawn from the field of psychology.83 Trait theory suggests that people 
generally act in accordance with personality traits,84 while situationism suggests 
                                                 
79 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay 
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1339–46 
(2000) (discussing the evolving justifications for homosexual sodomy laws); Matthew J. 
Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequality, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 87, 141–43 (2006) (discussing and critiquing the Supreme Court’s shifting rhetoric 
on colorblindness). 
80 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 194 (1904). 
81.Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997) (quoting United States v. 
Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)). 
82 Roger C. Park, Character Evidence Issues in the O.J. Simpson Case—Or, 
Rationales of the Character Evidence Ban, with Illustrations from the Simpson Case, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 747, 767–71 (1996). 
83 See Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1239–41 (2001). 
84 See GORDON W. ALLPORT, PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
287, 330–32 (1937); see also H.J. EYSENCK, THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY 3 
(3d. ed. 1970) (describing trait theory). 
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that people generally act in response to external stimuli.85 Interactionism is a 
dialectical middle ground.86 These psychological theories have played an important 
role in the evidence law literature. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the 
psychological literature has dominated the legal academic debate about the 
normative validity of the character evidence rule for the last twenty-five years.87 
Situationism in psychology lends support to the character prohibition in 
evidence law. Situationism probably reached its apex of influence in the late 1970s 
or early 1980s; it has since ebbed.88 It makes some sense that the character 
evidence prohibition would decline as situationism declined. 
But as an explanation for the decline of the character evidence rule, the rise of 
trait theory is not entirely satisfying. First, it is doubtful whether most legislators 
and judges are aware of the differences between trait theory and situationism. 
Perhaps some ambient acceptance of trait theory has filtered throughout society, 
but there no empirical evidence to support (or refute) such a claim. Second, the 
character evidence rule is said to be justified not by the risk that jurors will rely on 
the propensity inference, but rather by the risk that jurors will overweigh the 
propensity inference. Nearly everyone admits that the propensity inference is valid 
to some extent.89 The concern is that lay jurors believe the inference is more valid 
than it actually is.90 If ambient acceptance of trait theory has spread beyond the 
                                                 
85 WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT 177 (1968). 
86 See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, at xiv (1991); Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A 
Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, 
Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246, 
259–60 (1995). 
87 See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex 
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 561–62 (1994); David Crump, How Should We 
Treat Character Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279, 282–84 
(1987); Davies, supra note 50, at 513–23; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the 
“Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent 
Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 745–47 (2008); Miguel Angel Mendez, 
California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact 
of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1005, 1050–60 (1984); Miguel 
A. Méndez, The Law of Evidence and the Search for a Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 
221, 234 (1996); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 146–56 (1993); 
Charles H. Rose III, Caging the Beast: Formulating Effective Evidentiary Rules to Deal 
with Sexual Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 16–18 (2006). 
88 See Sanchirico, supra note 83, at 1240. 
89 E.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (“The State may not 
show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his 
neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a 
probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is 
irrelevant.”); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–81 (1997); 1A JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 55, at 1157–59 (Tillers rev., 1983). 
90 See Park, supra note 82, at 768. 
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psychological literature, this might lead jurors to overweigh the inference even 
more. The difference between perceived and actual value might be stable even if 
the absolute values have both risen. 
A better explanation links the decline of the character rule to the growing use 
of preventive detention. The character rule reflects discomfort with preventive 
detention,91 but as the criminal law increasingly grows accustomed to various 
forms of incapacitation, the need for the character rule no longer seems pressing. 
Put differently, the decline of the character evidence rule should be understood not 
simply as an indication that the aversion to propensity reasoning is disappearing, 
but also as an indication that the aversion to preventive detention is disappearing. 
To courts and legislatures, both reasons for the character evidence rule seem less 
persuasive than they once did. 
To be sure, the twin rationales for the character evidence rule cannot be neatly 
separated. Part of the story of the rule’s demise is that, in the age of actuarial 
methods for predicting punishment, character evidence seems like a decent way to 
determine whether the defendant committed the particular crime. But the darker 
and more important part of the story is that character evidence seems like a decent 
way to predict future crimes—and thus to justify imprisonment—regardless of 
whether the defendant committed the particular crime. 
As a formal matter, such reasoning still counts as nullification when a jury 
engages in it.92 But in the age of incapacitation, even if preventive detention by 
juries is still technically illegal, it does not seem as bad. When judges are deciding 
to admit character evidence, they must weigh the probative value of the evidence 
against the potential for prejudice.93 The latter side of the scale, in theory, includes 
the potential for preventive detention. In the age of incapacitation, that concern 
weighs less heavily. Indeed, the potential for preventive detention might even 
migrate to the other side of the scale. 
 
III.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
In sum, criminal law is shifting toward increased use of preventive detention, 
while evidence law is shifting to accommodate increased use of character 
evidence. The various reforms catalogued above represent a fundamental—and 
highly controversial—change in the theory animating the criminal justice system. 
Many (though not all) of the reforms have been legislative, and both academic 
commentators and litigators have argued that courts must develop constitutional 
doctrines to halt the move toward a regime based on incapacitation. 
In coming years, courts will be faced with increasing questions about whether, 
and to what extent, these reforms can be reconciled with the Constitution. Because 
the Constitution is largely silent on these matters, many legal challenges will be 
                                                 
91 See Robinson, supra note 11, at 1432. 
92 See Sanchirico, supra note 83, at 1246. 
93 See FED. R. EVID. 403, 404. 
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grounded in notions of substantive due process. For a variety of reasons, however, 
it is doubtful whether courts can or should develop more robust substantive due 
process doctrines to limit preventive detention. As a predictive matter, it is unlikely 
that courts will develop such doctrines. 
 
A.  Substantive Due Process and Preventive Detention 
 
Many have warned that the use of preventive detention poses grave threats to 
constitutional values, and indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution 
does impose some limitations on the use of preventive detention. But as currently 
drawn, those limitations have little bite, and they are unlikely to halt (or even slow) 
the rise of the new criminal law. In order to place meaningful limitations on 
legislative regimes of incapacitation, the Court would have to develop a vast new 
substantive due process architecture. That is neither likely nor feasible. 
Under current doctrine, the nature of the constitutional limitations depends in 
the first instance on whether the detention is “criminal” or “civil.”94 As the 
Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas v. Davis,95 
 
Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or 
other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the 
Due Process] Clause protects. And this Court has said that government 
detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a 
criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or, in certain 
special and “narrow” nonpunitive “circumstances,” where a special 
justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the 
“individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical 
restraint.”96 
 
In each realm, there are substantive and procedural limitations. Substantive 
limitations govern who can be detained, for what reasons, and for how long. 
Procedural limitations dictate what process the state must follow before detaining 
an individual. The former will be discussed in this section, the latter in the next. 
In both the criminal and civil realms, the Supreme Court has suggested that 
detention based on dangerousness alone is unconstitutional; in other words, the 
state may only detain a person if it demonstrates dangerousness plus some 
additional finding.97 But a close examination of these doctrines reveals that they do 
not and cannot place meaningful limitations on the state’s ability to engage in 
preventive detention. 
 
                                                 
94 In Part IV, infra, I will examine the line between these two realms. 
95 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
96 Id. at 690 (citations omitted). 
97 See supra notes 5, 131 and accompanying text.  
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1.  Substantive Constitutional Limitations on Preventive Detention: Criminal Law 
 
Traditionally, imposition of criminal liability in Anglo-American law has 
required a showing of some bad act. Opponents of preventive detention have 
argued, and the Supreme Court has suggested, that this tradition is inherent in the 
Constitution.98 They argue, in other words, that it is unconstitutional to impose 
criminal punishment based solely on future dangerousness because criminal 
liability requires some bad act.99 No such limitation is explicit in the Constitution, 
so such constitutional limitations are typically derived from either the Due Process 
Clause—in its “substantive” incarnation100—or on the Eighth Amendment.101 The 
Constitution, it is argued, contains an implicit act requirement that prohibits “pure” 
preventive detention in the criminal law.102 
These arguments have shortcomings. Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the 
Due Process Clause can be seen as an unproblematic source of a constitutional act 
requirement. Whether the Due Process Clause is properly interpreted as having a 
substantive component at all remains a controversial issue of constitutional law.103 
The Eighth Amendment, moreover, speaks more to the nature and amount of 
punishment imposed than it does to the question of what persons or conduct may 
be punished.104 
                                                 
98 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
99 See, e.g., ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR 
LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 18 (2006) (stating that the Constitution 
forbids legislatures “from imposing criminal punishment based simply on the ‘status’ of 
being dangerous, or for the punishment of future predicted crimes”). 
100 See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the 
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 321–22 
(2003) (arguing that preventive detention of sex offenders may violate principles of 
substantive due process). But see Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 
1997) (calling substantive due process an “oxymoron”). 
101 See infra note 104. 
102 See Slobogin, supra note 11, at 2 (defining pure preventative detention as “a 
deprivation of liberty that is based on a prediction of harmful conduct and that is not time-
limited by culpability or other considerations”); see also supra note 5, 131 and 
accompanying text.  
103 Compare Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs And Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, 
Procedural Due Process, And The Bill Of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 892 (2003) 
(supporting the doctrine of substantive due process), with John Harrison, Substantive Due 
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (1997) (criticizing the 
doctrine). See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 75 (1999) (suggesting that the Court should embrace a limited version of 
the substantive due process doctrine). 
104 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979–86 (1991) (arguing that the Eighth 
Amendment was primarily aimed at limiting certain modes of punishment); see also 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–47, 346 n.12 (1981) (discussing the primary 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, but also reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment has a 
“substantive” component). 
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Nonetheless, arguments against pure preventive detention in the criminal law 
find some support in the case law, most notably from Robinson v. California.105 
Robinson held that it was constitutionally impermissible to impose criminal 
punishments based on mere status or involuntary acts.106 Robinson was based on 
the Eighth Amendment,107 but commentators have since suggested that the 
Robinson rule should be regrounded in the Due Process Clause.108 
But Robinson is a shaky foundation for any constitutional doctrine. The 
rationale of Robinson was difficult to understand.109 The opinion generated 
immediate controversy,110 and it was quickly limited by the Court in Powell v. 
Texas.111 Over the years, lower courts have upheld a variety of criminal statutes 
against Robinson-based attacks.112 Robinson may be sui generis and unable to 
generate any meaningful body of case law.113 
Nonetheless, Robinson at least arguably stands for a constitutional principle 
that criminal punishment must be tied to some past act (or omission).114 Even if 
that is true, however, it has limited significance—the Robinson rule, by itself, 
accomplishes nearly nothing. At the most abstract level, it is meaningless because 
every person engages in some conduct. If Robinson only means that crimes must 
include some past act, then legislatures could evade the Robinson rule by drafting 
criminal laws that require the proof of some status and some additional, trivial 
conduct element—breathing, for example, or walking. Perhaps it would be 
unconstitutional to criminalize walking, but reaching that conclusion requires some 
additional constitutional doctrine quite independent of Robinson’s act requirement. 
In short, a constitutional act requirement does nothing unless it is 
supplemented by some additional doctrine describing what acts may be punished 
                                                 
105 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
106 Id. at 666–67 (“Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
107 Id.  
108 Martin R. Gardner, Rethinking Robinson v. California in the Wake of Jones v. Los 
Angeles: Avoiding the “Demise of the Criminal Law” by Attending to “Punishment,” 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 486 (2008). 
109 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5(f), at 180 (4th ed. 2003) (“The basis 
of the court’s decision in Robinson is not entirely clear, as emphasis was placed on three 
different considerations . . . .”). 
110 See Dale W. Broeder & Robert Wade Merson, Robinson v. California: An 
Abbreviated Study, 3 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 203, 203–07 (1965); Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea 
and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 147 n.144 (1962); see also Hugh R. 
Manes, Robinson v. California, A Farewell to Rationalism?, 22 LAW TRANSITION 238 
(1963). 
111 392 U.S. 514, 531–34 (1968). 
112 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 108, at 443–45. 
113 See id. at 431 (“Robinson thus had little impact and certainly did not result in 
radical doctrinal change.”). 
114 Legislatures have the power to punish at least certain omissions, such as the failure 
to pay taxes, and the failure to register as a sex offender. See LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 
6.2(e), at 319–20. 
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and those that may not. A few such limitations are found in the Bill of Rights, such 
as the First Amendment.115 Beyond those limited areas, other limitations must 
again be derived from the doctrine of substantive due process. The Lochner-era 
Court was fairly aggressive in striking down criminal statutes as substantive due 
process violations.116 But with a few notable exceptions such as Lawrence v. 
Texas,117 the modern Supreme Court has been much more restrained.118 The 
doctrine of substantive due process survives today, but it imposes only very limited 
restrictions on the ability of legislatures to criminalize a wide variety of conduct.119 
Thus, legislatures can incapacitate dangerous individuals simply by tying detention 
to some conduct, so long as the conduct is not one of the very narrow classes of 
conduct protected by substantive due process. To be sure, as a political matter, 
legislatures are unlikely to tie criminal punishment to conduct as trivial and 
innocent as, say, walking. And if legislatures were to try such a strategy, courts 
might respond by developing a more robust substantive due process doctrine. 
Thus, legislatures are left with a more practical strategy for incapacitation of 
dangerous persons: they may simply impose lengthy sentences based on fairly 
trivial crimes. That is, after all, precisely how “Three Strikes” and other recidivist 
sentencing regimes work—dangerousness (measured by criminal history) plus a 
minor current offense justifies lengthy incarceration.120 As the Supreme Court 
wrote in Ewing v. California,121 
 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., id. § 3.5, at 161–66. 
116 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (striking down a statute limiting the 
number of hours that bakers could work) (1905); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 
26 (1915) (holding that Kansas could not criminally punish employers for requiring 
employees to agree not to join a labor union); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590–
593 (1897) (striking down a statute regulating transactions with out-of-state insurance 
companies); LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 3.3(a), at 142 (noting that the Court struck down 
over a hundred statutes, many of which were criminal, on due process grounds during the 
first third of the twentieth century). 
117 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute outlawing 
certain sexual conduct between two individuals of the same sex). 
118 See LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 3.5(a), at 144 (noting that the Supreme Court has 
“all but abandoned the practice of invalidating criminal statutes on the basis that they bear 
no substantial relation to injury to the public”); see also Robert C. Post, Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 94 n.440 (2003) 
(noting that the Court’s recent cases have “reduce[d] substantive due process into a 
doctrine that is for all practical purposes toothless.”). 
119 Some academic commentators have proposed a more robust substantive due 
process doctrine that would limit the state’s ability to punish “victimless” conduct, but such 
proposals face insurmountable difficulties, both doctrinal and conceptual. See, e.g., Marcus 
Dirk Drubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 833, 839 (2001). 
120 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
121 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
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When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a 
judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating 
criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or 
violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California 
from making that choice. To the contrary, our cases establish that “States 
have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals.” 
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27, 113 S. Ct. 517, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 
(1992); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 
(1962) (“[T]he constitutionality of the practice of inflicting severer 
criminal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to serious 
challenge.”). Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis 
for increased punishment.122 
 
What this means is that even a reinvigorated Lochner-style due process doctrine 
could not halt the march of the new criminal law without help from a much more 
robust Eighth Amendment proportionality doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has said that, outside the capital punishment context, 
proportionality doctrine has only limited applicability.123 Academic commentators 
have criticized the Court’s deferential approach, but fashioning a better doctrine is 
not easy.124 (If a twenty-five year sentence for a third strike is too much, how much 
is permissible? twenty years? fifteen?). Moreover, when it comes to recidivist 
sentencing, it is hard to fault Ewing’s conclusion that incapacitation is a legitimate 
goal of detention, and thus longer sentences for repeat offenders make sense. 
In sum, developing meaningful substantive limitations on the use of 
preventive detention in the criminal law would involve not just (1) maintaining 
Robinson’s (somewhat dubious) conclusion that the constitution contains an act 
requirement, but also (2) developing a new substantive due process doctrine 
defining which acts may be criminalized, and (3) developing a new proportionality 
doctrine defining to what extent various acts may be punished. It would involve the 
creation of new constitutional doctrines defining both what conduct may be 
proscribed by the criminal law and how much punishment is allowed. It is hard to 
see how any theory of constitutional interpretation could justify such a massive 
intrusion by the courts into substantive criminal law. 
Incapacitation is one legitimate function of criminal punishment. In recent 
years, it has become a dominant function, and in the process, it has begun to 
                                                 
122 Id. at 25. 
123 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (stating that for many non-
capital criminal cases, the Eighth Amendment prescribes only a “narrow proportionality 
principle, that does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but rather 
forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
124 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985 (“While there are relatively clear historical 
guidelines and accepted practices that enable judges to determine which modes of 
punishment are ‘cruel and unusual,’ proportionality does not lend itself to such analysis.”). 
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reshape the criminal law. With few exceptions, the Supreme Court cannot, and will 
not, interfere with that process. 
 
2.  Substantive Constitutional Limitations on Preventive Detention: Civil Law 
 
Unlike criminal detention, civil or nonpunitive detention is (purportedly) only 
allowed in “certain special and ‘narrow’” circumstances.125 The Court has 
identified three primary circumstances where such detention is allowed:126 (1) 
temporary detention during pending criminal or immigration proceedings,127 (2) 
detention of dangerous and mentally ill persons,128 and (3) detention of enemy 
combatants during wartime.129 The Court has also additional “exceptions,” outside 
these main categories, where civil preventive detention may be allowed.130 
As in the criminal realm, the Court’s precedents in the civil realm suggest that 
it is unconstitutional for the state to detain a person based on a finding of 
dangerousness alone.131 But as in the criminal realm, those limitations are, in 
reality, fairly minimal. Requiring “dangerousness plus something” does not 
amount to much where the something is conceptually underdetermined and thus 
easily established. 
The very concept of mental illness—which can provide the “plus something” 
that justifies detention—is both fluid and deeply contingent. Over the past century, 
new mental illnesses have been created and definitions of existing mental illnesses 
have been expanded.132 The process of medicalization of any deviant behavior is 
relentless, and it is ongoing. 
                                                 
125 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
126 David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 708 (2009). 
127 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
524, 541 (1952). 
128 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 426 (1979). 
129 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 (2004). 
130 See Cole, supra note 126, at 715–18. 
131 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80–83 (1992); see also Cole, supra note 126, at 
710 (“Commitment for dangerousness alone is not constitutionally permitted.”); Janus & 
Logan, supra note 100, at 325; Rinat Kitai-Sangero, The Limits of Preventive Detention, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 903, 907 (2009); Slobogin, supra note 11, at 35 (“The majority 
opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks indicated, more than once, that dangerousness alone is an 
insufficient basis for long-term preventive detention.”). 
132 See PETER CONRAD, THE MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: ON THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS 3–4 (2007); 
PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM 
BADNESS TO SICKNESS, at xi (1980); CHRISTOPHER LANE, SHYNESS: HOW NORMAL 
BEHAVIOR BECAME A SICKNESS 2–3 (2007). 
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The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders133 (DSM) is considered the authoritative standard for definitions 
of mental illness in the United States. But the definitions and diagnostic criteria are 
often indeterminate, which has led to persistent criticisms regarding the validity 
and reliability of diagnoses.134 Over time, moreover, with each new edition of the 
DSM, the scope of what counts as a “mental illness” has grown.135 (That growth 
may be tied, at least in part, to the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on the 
DSM.)136 In short, broad and vague definitions of mental illness make it relatively 
easy for states to engage in preventive detention based on mental illness.137 
That problem will not disappear. The fifth edition of the DSM is currently 
under construction. Among the proposed changes are expanded definitions of sex-
related “disorders,” including “pedohephebilia,” “hypersexuality disorder,” and 
“paraphilic coercive disorder.”138 The expansive definitions of paraphilia could 
mean that anyone with a persistent desire to engage in nonconsensual sex would be 
considered disordered, and thus eligible for civil commitment.139 
The expanding scope of recognized mental disorders means that nearly all 
people who are highly dangerous are also likely to be disordered in some way. 
Thus, while it remains formally true that dangerousness alone is insufficient for 
civil commitment, that limitation has a significance that is already limited and is 
continually waning. Ultimately, there are few meaningful substantive limitations 
on the state’s ability to engage in preventive detention of dangerous individuals. 
 
B.  Substantive Due Process and Character Evidence 
 
Courts will continue to face challenges to preventive detention regimes and as 
additional reforms erode the character evidence rule, courts will also face questions 
                                                 
133 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (text rev. 4th ed. 2000). 
134 Enrique Baca-Garcia et al., Diagnostic Stability of Psychiatric Disorders in 
Clinical Practice, 190 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 210, 216 (2007); Robert Kendell & Assen 
Jablensky, Distinguishing Between the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 160 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 11 (2003); Harold Alan Pincus et al., Letter to the Editor, “Clinical 
Significance” and DSM-IV, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1145, 1145 (1998). 
135 See, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: Transsubstantive 
Behavior and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 77 (2008) (noting that the 
fourth edition of the DSM listed 300 mental disorders compared to about 100 disorders 
listed in the first edition). 
136 See Lisa Cosgrove et al., Financial Ties Between DSM-IV Panel Members and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 75 PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 154, 156–57 (2006). 
137 See Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of 
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 133–37 (1999) (discussing the difficulties in 
incorporating DSM definitions into legal standards). 
138 See Allen Frances, Commentary, Opening Pandora’s Box: The 19 Worst 
Suggestions for DSM5, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, 2–3 (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.psychiatric 
times.com/dsm/content/article/10168/1522341. 
139 See id. 
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about whether the use of character evidence is constitutionally permissible. Several 
scholars have argued that the character rule has constitutional underpinnings.140 A 
few lower federal courts have agreed that the rule might be grounded in due 
process,141 and two state supreme courts—Iowa and Missouri—have struck down 
state analogues to Federal Rule 413 under their state Due Process Clauses.142 For 
its part, the United States Supreme Court has left the question open.143 Most other 
courts have rejected constitutional challenges to the use of character evidence.144 
The argument for constitutionalizing the character evidence rule is colorable but 
ultimately unpersuasive, and in any event, it is difficult to imagine any workable 
constitutional rule restricting character evidence. 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention the character evidence rule, so 
arguments about its constitutional underpinnings are necessarily based on the Due 
Process Clause.145 The usual argument is that the character evidence rule is so 
firmly rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and so central to our notions of 
criminal justice, that it must be maintained as a matter of fundamental fairness.146 
                                                 
140 See Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His 
Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (1996); Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due Process, and the False Promise 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487, 1517 (2005); William E. 
Marcantel, Note, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri Supreme Court’s 
Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as Propensity Evidence, 74 MO. L. REV. 211, 
230–31 (2009); Jason L. McCandless, Note, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad Rules: The 
Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 5 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 689, 714 (1997). 
141 See, e.g., Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991); Tucker v. 
Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989). 
142 State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 762–63, 769 (Iowa 2010); State v. Ellison, 239 
S.W.3d 603, 607–08 (Mo. 2007). 
143 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (“Because we need not reach 
the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process 
Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a 
charged crime.”). 
144 See United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 487 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 800–
01 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998); People 
v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d 182, 184 (Cal. 1999). 
145 See Drew D. Dropkin & James H. McComas, On a Collision Course: Pure 
Propensity Evidence and Due Process in Alaska, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 177, 190 (2001); 
James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex 
Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 107–08 (1994) 
(arguing that the admission of propensity evidence violates the Due Process Clause); Natali 
& Stigall, supra note 140, at 3; see also 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 404-14 to -18 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010) 
(suggesting that the character evidence rule has constitutional underpinnings). 
146 See State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757, 768 (Iowa 2010) (“Based on Iowa’s history and 
the legal reasoning for prohibiting admission of propensity evidence out of fundamental 
conceptions of fairness, we hold the Iowa Constitution prohibits admission of prior bad acts 
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As a historical matter, the due process argument is shaky. It is true that the 
character evidence rule predates the Bill of Rights, by nearly a century.147 It is 
approximately as old as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, which is also 
not mentioned in the Constitution, but which the Supreme Court has read into the 
Due Process Clause.148 There is thus a decent argument that because the character 
evidence rule has a roughly equal historical pedigree, it too should be granted 
constitutional status.149  
But while it is true that the character evidence rule is old, its scope, content, 
and rationale have shifted over time.150 The original rationale had to do mostly 
with notice and surprise.151 But with modern procedural devices, including rules of 
discovery, those concerns no longer seem at all pressing. The modern rationale for 
the character evidence rule—the concerns of propensity overweighing and 
preventive detention—were not clearly articulated until the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth century.152 The lack of congruence between the original and modern 
rationales makes the historical argument for constitutionalizing the character 
evidence rule more complicated. The scope of the rule has varied widely as well, 
and for as long as courts have (purportedly) enforced the character evidence rule, 
they have also recognized a bewildering variety of “exceptions.”153 
History aside, arguments for a due process-based character evidence rule 
typically rest on more abstract conceptions of “fundamental fairness.” But the 
phrase “fundamental fairness” is nothing more than a label—there are limitless 
rules that could arguably be called necessary for fundamental fairness. Applying 
the Due Process Clause requires courts to give some reason why the character 
evidence rule, is truly necessary for “fundamental fairness,” and therefore 
                                                                                                                            
evidence based solely on general propensity.”); see also Aviva Orenstein, Honoring 
Margaret Berger with a Sensible Idea: Insisting that Judges Employ a Balancing Test 
Before Admitting the Accused’s Convictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2), 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 1291, 1303–07 (2010) (suggesting that the admission of prior convictions 
to show character for truthfulness can be unfairly prejudicial). 
147 See LANGBEIN, supra note 54, at 190–91. 
148 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–64 (1970). 
149 See Natali & Stigall, supra note 140, at 13 (“Applying the foregoing historical test, 
it is clear that the exclusion of propensity evidence at trial constitutes due process.”). 
150 Moreover, the “historical approach” to interpreting the Due Process Clause has 
inherent limitations. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“The Constitution does not encompass all traditional legal rules and customs, no matter 
how longstanding and widespread such practices may be.”); United States v. Enjady, 134 
F.3d 1427, 1432 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a constitutional challenge and stating “[t]hat 
the practice is ancient does not mean it is embodied in the Constitution”). 
151 See LANGBEIN, supra note 54, at 191; Reed, supra note 54, at 716–19 (discussing 
the rule’s early history). 
152 See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 194. 
153 See DAVID LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENCE OF OTHER MISCONDUCT 
AND SIMILAR EVENTS § 4.4 (2009); see also LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1025 (pointing out that 
since at least the nineteenth century, courts have admitted character evidence in cases of 
sex crimes). 
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constitutionally-based, while many other rules are not. Unfortunately, the 
arguments regarding the constitutional footing of the character evidence rule 
seldom venture beyond sloganeering.  
In striking down its sex crimes provision, for example, the Iowa Supreme 
Court used the word “fundamental” over a dozen times, as if repeating the claim 
over and over could make it true.154 It reasoned “[a] concomitant of the 
presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for 
who he is.”155 Even if it is true that a defendant may only be tried for what he 
did—something that is at least doubtful in an age when incapacitation dominates 
the criminal law—the court offered no satisfying explanation as to why past acts 
may not be used to prove “what he did” in this case. Perhaps it is true that juries 
overweigh the propensity inference, and perhaps it is true that when given access 
to past bad acts, juries engage in (too much) preventive detention. But those points 
are far from self-evident. If the character evidence rule is to be written into the 
constitution, then its underlying twin rationales require substantial support and 
justification. The Iowa Supreme Court offered none.  
But even its supporters are correct that the character evidence rule is grounded 
in the Due Process Clause, it remains unclear what a constitutional rule would look 
like. Any effort to ground the character evidence rule in the Constitution faces 
significant conceptual difficulties. Academic commentators have long criticized 
the immense body of case law attempting to enforce the character rule.156 The 
character evidence rule has spawned a wide variety of legal fictions, primarily, but 
not solely, the fictions of Rule 404(b), which admit character evidence (or 
something very much like it) for other purposes.157 Indeed, the admission of other 
acts evidence has been so widespread that some commentators have suggested that 
the character evidence rule itself is entirely fictional.158 Even the Iowa Supreme 
Court, after extolling the virtues of the character evidence rule and striking down a 
sex crimes exception, was quick to note that bad acts may be admitted for other 
                                                 
154 State v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757 passim (Iowa 2010).  
155 Id. at 767 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 23–24 (Iowa 2004)). 
156 See, e.g., Slough & Knightly, supra note 73; Stone, supra note 55; Julius Stone, 
The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954 (1933). 
157 For example, the widely used “unlinked plan” doctrine has long been criticized as 
a rank fiction. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 74, § 3.24 (criticizing the unlinked plan 
doctrine); 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
4.35, at 668 (3d ed. 2010) (criticizing the “thin fiction” of “spurious plan cases”); Bryden 
& Park, supra note 87, 546–51 (discussing the “spurious plan” doctrine of Rule 404(b)); 
Méndez & Imwinkelried, supra note 75, passim (same); Reed, supra note 71, at 233–34 
(same); Stuart, supra note 71, at 197–98 (same); Swift, supra note 3, at 2470–71 (same). 
158 See generally Andrew J. Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Fictitious 
Ban on Character Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181 (1998); see 
also Melilli, supra note 57, at 1558–62 (arguing that courts routinely admit propensity 
evidence and always have). 
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404(b)-type purposes.159 But across American jurisdictions, the line between 
permissible 404(b) evidence and impermissible propensity evidence is 
maddeningly hazy. 
It might be that the rule itself is simply conceptually flawed, indeterminate not 
just at the margins but at its core. Even among evidence scholars, it is hard to find 
any basic agreement about what exactly “character” means, or what exactly the 
“propensity inference” entails.160 The most sophisticated evidence law 
commentators disagree about whether certain uses of evidence even constitute 
character-based uses.161 The Herculean efforts of academics to make sense of the 
rule,162 even to the (unclear) extent that they are conceptually successful, are 
largely ignored by courts. The rule spawns thousands of appellate cases each 
year,163 and courts continue to produce doctrine that is roundly criticized by 
academics as unprincipled and careless.164 
The rule, in its current form, has been unable to resist attacks. There is no 
reason to think that the rule would fare much better if it were incorporated into the 
Due Process Clause. Constitutionalization would defeat any efforts for outright 
repeal of Rule 404, but it would do little or nothing to heal the thousand small cuts 
                                                 
159 Cox, 781 N.W.2d. at 768 (“Such evidence may, however, be admitted as proof for 
any legitimate issues for which prior bad acts are relevant and necessary, including those 
listed in rule 5.404(b) and developed through Iowa case law.”).  
160 See Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 
781, 813 (1998) (“There is no meaningful sense (except in a ‘technical’ and arid legal 
sense) in which it can be said that the law prohibits the use of evidence of a person’s 
‘character’ to show conduct.”). 
161 Compare Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Evolution of the Use of the Doctrine of 
Chances as Theory of Admissibility for Similar Fact Evidence, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 73, 
94–96 (1993) (concluding that the “doctrine of chances” provides a legitimate noncharacter 
inference), with Paul F. Rothstein, Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1259, 1268–70 (1995) (concluding that the “doctrine of chances” violates the 
character evidence rule). 
162 This single area of evidence law spawned entire treatises. See generally EDWARD 
J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (2006); LEONARD, supra note 153. 
163 See also 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5239 (1st ed. 1978) (“There is no question of 
evidence more frequently litigated in the appellate courts than the admissibility of evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”). 
164 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 157, § 4:28 (“Perhaps because the issue 
so inundates courts hearing criminal appeals, published opinions often give it but passing 
mention, and it is lamentably common to see recitations of laundry lists of permissive uses, 
with little analysis or attention to the particulars.”); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 145, 
§ 404.20[3] (“[C]ourts on occasion have admitted other-acts evidence almost 
automatically, without any real analysis, if they find it fits within one of the categories 
specified in Rule 404(b).”); WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 163, § 5239 (“Yet despite the 
recurrence of the issues, the [appellate] opinions are often poorly reasoned and provide 
little guidance to trial judges.”). 
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that are bleeding the rule to death. The evidence law fictions that courts embrace 
today would simply be translated into constitutional fictions. 
In sum, arguments for constitutionalizing the character evidence rule stand on 
shaky ground, and even if they were to succeed, the victory would be pyrrhic. 
Substantive due process doctrine is both textually and conceptually ill-equipped to 
stem the rising tide of preventive detention. 
 
IV.  REDRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The rise of preventive detention and corresponding decline of the character 
evidence rule will not be abated by any doctrine of substantive due process, but 
they do have one critically important constitutional implication. The growing 
influence of incapacitation theory in the criminal law destabilizes the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions. 
Drawing the line between “civil” and “criminal” sanctions is a constitutional 
necessity because several provisions of the Constitution turn on the distinction.165 
The procedural rights contained in the Sixth Amendment apply only in “criminal 
cases.”166 Several provisions of the Fifth Amendment—the Grand Jury Clause, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Self-Incrimination Clause—likewise limit their 
own applicability to the criminal sphere.167 Still other constitutional provisions, 
including the Ex Post Facto Clauses168 and the Eighth Amendment,169 lack explicit 
textual limitations but are nonetheless understood as applying solely or primarily 
to criminal cases.170 Thus, in determining the scope of these provisions, the 
Supreme Court has no choice but to distinguish between criminal and civil laws.171 
 
                                                 
165 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (“The distinction between a civil 
penalty and a criminal penalty is of some constitutional import.”); Mary C. Cheh, 
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: 
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 
1325, 1348–49 (1991). For a discussion of the different modes of procedure in the two 
realms, see generally David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without 
Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 
GEO. L.J. 683 (2006). 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
167 See U.S. CONST. amend V. The Grand Jury Clause is limited to “capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime[s].” Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects successive 
punishments for the “same offence.” Id. The Self-Incrimination Clause applies “in any 
criminal case.” Id. 
168 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
170 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248 (“Other constitutional protections, while not explicitly 
limited to one context or the other, have been so limited by decision of this Court.”). 
171 Analysis of the distinction, moreover, raises policy concerns about the proper 
scope of the criminal law. See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. 
L. REV. 703, 712–19 (2005). 
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A.  The Current Doctrine and Its Critics 
 
While constitutionally necessary, the task of drawing the line between civil 
and criminal has been notoriously difficult.172 The Court’s doctrine has been 
somewhat shifty,173 so even describing the doctrine accurately is challenging, but 
the Court has (for now) more or less settled on a two-prong test.174 
The first prong focuses on the facial statutory label or classification. It asks 
whether the statute is labeled “civil” or “criminal”: “Whether a particular 
punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory 
construction. A court must first ask whether the legislature, ‘in establishing the 
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one 
label or the other.’”175 
The second prong is a multi-factor balancing test, drawn from Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez.176 It examines: 
 
(1) “whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; 
(2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) 
“whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether 
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution 
and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already 
a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally 
be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive 
in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”177 
 
If the first-prong analysis indicates that the legislature intended the statute to be 
civil in nature, the Court will only deem the statute criminal if the second-prong 
analysis clearly indicates that the statute is punitive in its purposes and effects.178 
The Court’s doctrine has been justifiably criticized on a number of grounds.179 
The operation of the first prong allows legislatures to evade constitutional rights 
                                                 
172 See Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The 
Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 103 (2002) (discussing the “fading line” between the criminal and 
civil realms). 
173 See Cheh, supra note 165, at 1358. 
174 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95 (2003); see also id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ur cases have adopted a two-step enquiry to see whether a law is punitive for purposes 
of various constitutional provisions including the Ex Post Facto Clause.”). 
175 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citation omitted) (quoting Ward, 
448 U.S. at 248). 
176 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
177 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99–100 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69). 
178 Smith, 538 U.S. at 95–96. 
179 See Cheh, supra note 165, at 1358 (“Although this comparative factor [i.e., 
Mendoza] test has been invoked repeatedly, it is doubtful whether the Court is prepared to 
apply it seriously.”). 
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with mere labels.180 The first prong is particularly difficult to justify in light of 
Apprendi v. New Jersey and its progeny.181 If legislatures are not allowed to evade 
the Constitution’s procedural requirements simply by labeling something a 
“sentencing factor” rather than an “element,” it is hard to see why they should be 
able to evade those same requirements by attaching a civil label to a sanction.182 
The seven-factor second prong is wildly indeterminate.183 It is difficult to 
apply certain factors in particular cases, and when different factors point different 
directions, it is difficult to combine them.184 The Court has not clarified the matter 
much by asserting that the seven factors are nonexclusive and merely “useful 
guideposts.”185 In short, the general problems that plague all multifactor tests also 
plague the Mendoza test.186 
But as always, it is easier to criticize the Court’s failings than construct a 
better doctrine. A decade ago, for example, Carol Steiker wrote an intelligent and 
                                                 
180 Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 
35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1288–89 (1998); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme 
Court 1996 Term: Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 61 
(1997) (“The indispensable function of constitutional doctrine . . . is to implement the 
Constitution.”). 
181 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (“‘[L]abels do not afford an acceptable answer.’ That 
point applies as well to the constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 
‘“elements’” and ‘sentencing factors.’” (citations omitted) (quoting New Jersey v. 
Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 492 (N.J. 1999))); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 241–42 (2005) (“[T]he Commission’s authority to identify the facts relevant to 
sentencing decisions and to determine the impact of such facts on federal sentences is 
precisely the same whether one labels such facts ‘“sentencing factors’” or ‘“elements’” of 
crimes.”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (rejecting the view that “the 
jury need only find whatever facts the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime”); 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s 
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the 
State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
182 See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 
1545 (2001) (“Just as the continuing stream of newly minted civil penalties necessitated a 
more specific standard for distinguishing which penalties labeled ‘civil’ must nevertheless 
be treated as criminal, innovative offense definitions following Apprendi will require the 
development of some method of distinguishing elements from non-elements under the 
Constitution.”). 
183 See Logan, supra note 180, at 1282 (“The Mendoza-Martinez factors over the 
years have been applied in a highly selective and ultimately inconsistent manner.”). 
184 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 565 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
multi-factor test as “lack[ing] any real content”). 
185 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 
93, 99 (1997)). 
186 See Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
773, 781 (1990) (criticizing multi-factor tests); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 63 (2004) (“Whether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors 
the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them.”). 
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incisive article criticizing the Court’s then-recent jurisprudence.187 She proposed a 
different test: that criminal punishments are those that are intended to express 
blame.188 But who can say whether the civil commitment of sex offenders, for 
example, constitutes “blaming”? Such a characterization seems plausible,189 but 
contrary characterizations seem equally plausible.190 
Other commentators have suggested that the Court should rely less on the 
legislative label and more on the legislative purpose.191 Any proposed doctrine that 
turns on divining the true legislative purpose of some incapacitating regime faces 
all of the usual conceptual difficulties in explaining what “legislative purpose” 
even means, not to mention the evidentiary difficulties of unearthing the real 
purpose beneath the pretext.192 In short, both the Supreme Court and its academic 
critics have struggled to fashion a sensible doctrinal line between criminal and civil 
enforcement regimes. 
 
B.  Re-examining the Fourth Factor 
 
Putting some of the larger questions about the two-prong test aside, there is 
one small, but important, aspect of the Supreme Court’s doctrine that should be 
modified in light of the rise of preventive detention in the criminal law: the fourth 
Mendoza factor should be modified or discarded. 
The fourth factor asks whether the sanction operates to promote one of the 
two traditional aims of punishment: deterrence or retribution.193 It thus assumes 
that other purposes, including incapacitation, are paradigmatically civil.194 At 
times, the Court has given this factor more weight than the other Mendoza factors. 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, for example, the core of the Court’s analysis of the second 
                                                 
187 Steiker, supra note 6. 
188 Id. at 805–06. 
189 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 71 (1996). 
190 Steiker, supra note 6, at 818 (“[O]verall, schemes to commit ‘sexually violent 
predators’ and schemes to commit the violent mentally ill both seem to speak much more 
clearly the language of prevention than that of blame.”). 
191 See Logan, supra note 180, at 1295–1312 (arguing for a more robust and less 
deferential inquiry into the legislative purpose of sexual offender commitment statutes); see 
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law 
Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1875–93 (1992) (arguing 
that the distinction should depend on whether the statute seeks to outlaw conduct 
altogether, rather than simply force the actor to internalize the costs). 
192 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION passim (1997); Stephen Breyer, 
On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 846 
(1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517. 
193 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
194 See id. 
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prong was its insistence that the goal of the sexual offender commitment regime 
was preventive detention, and therefore the regime was civil.195 
The Court’s occasional insistence that incapacitation is para-digmatically civil 
cannot be maintained. In other contexts, the Court has recognized that 
incapacitation is a legitimate and important goal of the criminal justice system.196 
To be sure, the Supreme Court still occasionally seems to deny, as a descriptive 
matter, that incapacitation is goal of criminal punishment,197 but such denials are 
patently false, and increasingly so. Incapacitation is now a dominant force in 
criminal law. It shapes actual punishment practices as much as deterrence and 
retribution do.198 
 
C.  An Originalist Approach – “Traditional Aims” Reconsidered 
 
Of course, the fourth Mendoza factor focuses not on contemporary penal 
theory but rather on the “traditional” aims of punishment.199 It might be argued that 
even if incapacitation is now a dominant goal of criminal law, it was not 
traditionally a dominant goal. Put differently, an originalist might argue that when 
the framers wrote the word “criminal,” they meant “laws with goals of deterrence 
and retribution.” 
Even if the originalist approach is the proper approach, however, Mendoza’s 
assumption that deterrence and retribution have traditionally been the primary or 
sole goals of punishment is simply wrong as a matter of historical fact. An 
examination of eighteenth-century penal theory suggests that retribution was not 
considered a valid goal of punishment, while incapacitation was, at least by many 
of the most influential theorists. 
At the outset, it must be admitted that there is no easy way to determine what 
the “true” aims of punishment were in the eighteenth century. Our best evidence is 
from the writing of eighteenth-century commentators, but their views may not 
represent the values that animated actual punishment practices at the time. The 
commentators were elites, after all, many of whom were writing precisely to 
criticize contemporary practices in general—and in particular, contemporary 
                                                 
195 521 U.S. 346, 360–63 (1997). 
196 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25 (2003); Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. 
Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 290–91 (2007). At other times, 
however, the Court has continued to exclude incapacitation from the menu or permissible 
punishment goals.  
197 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (stating that the 
“three principal rationales” of punishment are retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation); 
see also Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth 
Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1212–14 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s decision 
in Panetti v. Quarterman implicitly excludes incapacitation as a legitimate rationale for 
punishment). 
198 HARCOURT, supra note 1, at 26–31. 
199 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168. 
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imposition of the death penalty. Moreover, eighteenth-century penal theorists held 
wildly divergent views on the proper aims of criminal punishment.200 
Nonetheless, an examination of eighteenth-century penal theory undermines 
Mendoza’s historical assumption in two ways. First, it is not true that retribution 
was considered a valid function of the criminal law.201 The death penalty 
dominated arguments of the day, and neither supporters nor opponents made their 
arguments in terms of retribution.202 In fact, even the conservative supporters of 
the death penalty tended to explicitly disclaim that retribution was a goal.203 The 
prevailing view at the time was that retribution was a task for God and God alone, 
while human punishment had different ends.204 
Second, many eighteenth-century penal theorists recognized incapac-itation as 
a legitimate goal of punishment. Commentators of all political stripes tended to 
focus on crime prevention as the chief aim of punishment,205 and many recognized 
incapacitation as one form of prevention, at least implicitly.206 Others, like 
                                                 
200 See FRANK MCLYNN, CRIME AND & PUNISHMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 243 (1989) (“The entire subject of the impact of Enlightenment thought on 
English penal theory in the eighteenth century is problematical. And no one view ever held 
predominance at any one time.”). 
201 The operation of medieval criminal law, by contrast, may have been more 
obviously motivated by principles of vengeance. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction 
Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 80–83 (1996). 
202 See MCLYNN, supra note 200, at 249 (stating that the primary theoretical debate 
was between those who viewed deterrence as the goal of punishment and those who viewed 
rehabilitation as the goal of punishment). 
203 WILLIAM EDEN AUCKLAND, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 6 (1771) (“It is from an 
abuse of language that we apply the word ‘punishment’ to human institutions: Vengeance 
belongeth not to man.”); WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 373 (Liberty Fund Inc. 2002) (1752) (“The proper end of human punishment 
is not the satisfaction of justice, but the prevention of crimes. By the satisfaction of justice, 
I mean the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt; which is the dispensation we must 
expect at the hand of God . . . .”). 
204 Cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *11 (stating that the goal of 
“human punishments” was not “atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for that 
must be left to the just determination of the Supreme Being”). 
205 HENRY FIELDING, THE JOURNAL OF A VOYAGE TO LISBON 31 (1752) (“Example 
alone is the end of all public punishments and rewards. Laws never inflict disgrace in 
resentment, nor confer honour from gratitude.”); MARTIN MADAN, THOUGHTS ON 
EXECUTIVE JUSTICE, WITH RESPECT TO OUR CRIMINAL LAWS 11 (1785) (“The prevention 
of crimes is the great end of all legal feverity . . . .”); see also SAMUEL ROMILLY, 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 23 (1810) (“The sole object of human 
punishments, it is admitted, is the prevention of crimes; and to this end, they operate 
principally by the terror of example.”). 
206 See PALEY, supra note 203, at 373 (arguing that if criminals were not punished, 
they would “repeat the same crimes, or . . . commit different crimes”); cf. Madan, supra 
note 205, at 10 (“[T]he sooner the malefactor is removed from out of the society the better   
. . . .”). 
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Blackstone and Bentham, made the point quite explicitly. Blackstone wrote that 
the goal of punishment was to serve as: 
 
a precaution against future offences of the same kind. This is effected 
three ways: either by the amendment of the offender himself; for which 
purpose all corporal punishments, fines, and temporary exile or 
imprisonment are inflicted: or, by deterring others by the dread of his 
example from offending in the like way, . . . which gives rise to all 
ignominious punishments, and to such executions of justice as are open 
and public: or, lastly, by depriving the party injuring of the power to do 
future mischief; which is effected either by putting him to death; or 
condemning him to perpetual confinement, slavery, or exile.207 
 
Put in modern terms, Blackstone thus described three purposes: (1) reformation 
and specific deterrence of the individual offender, accomplished primarily by 
minor sanctions; (2) general deterrence, accomplished primarily by shaming 
sanctions; and (3) incapacitation, accomplished primarily by death or other 
permanent sanctions.208 
Bentham’s views were similar. He argued that the goal of punishment was to 
prevent future crimes in two ways: “[p]articular prevention, which applies to the 
delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all the members 
of the community without exception.”209 He argued that general prevention should 
be the “chief end of punishment,”210 but he nonetheless recognized incapacitation 
as a wholly legitimate function.211 
 
With respect to any particular delinquent, we have seen that punishment 
has three objects,—incapacitation, reformation, and intimidation. If the 
crime committed is of a kind calculated to inspire great alarm, as 
manifesting a very mischievous disposition, it becomes necessary to take 
from him the power of committing it again. But if the crime, being less 
dangerous, only justifies transient punishment, and it is possible for the 
                                                 
207 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 204, at *11–12. 
208 Like Blackstone, many other contemporary commentators argued that prisons and 
workhouses should be used in part of reformation and rehabilitation. See, e.g., THOMAS 
ALCOCK, OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFECTS OF THE POOR LAWS 70–72 (1752). 
209 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 61 (James T. McHugh ed., 
Prometheus Books 2009) (1830). 
210 Id. at 62. 
211 Id. at 61–62; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 170–71 n.1 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1781) (stating that the “principle end 
of punishment is to control action,” and that one mechanism by which punishment 
control’s action is by restraint on the offender’s “physical power, in which case it is said to 
operate by disablement”). 
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delinquent to return to society, it is proper that the punishment should 
possess qualities calculated to reform or intimidate him.212 
 
The views of Bentham and Blackstone were both influential,213 and were both 
fairly typical of the time.214 
Similar views endorsing incapacitation as a legitimate and necessary form of 
crime prevention were expressed throughout the nineteenth century as well.215 In 
his magisterial history of English criminal law, Stephen noted that while the public 
has a desire for vengeance, the best aim of criminal punishment was prevention. 
 
Another object is the direct prevention of crime, either by fear, or by 
disabling or even destroying the offender, and this which is I think 
commonly put forward as the only proper object of legal punishments is 
beyond all question distinct from the one just mentioned [i.e., retribution] 
and of coordinate importance with it. The two objects are in no degree 
inconsistent with each other, on the contrary they go hand in hand and 
may be regarded respectively as the secondary and the primary effects of 
the administration of criminal justice.216 
 
Like Blackstone and Bentham, Stephen saw incapacitation as an important means 
of crime prevention. 
The Supreme Court’s assertion that retribution and deterrence are the only 
two traditional goals of punishment was made for the first time in the mid-
twentieth century.217 The assertion was essentially apocryphal, made without 
                                                 
212 BENTHAM, supra note 209, at 62. 
213 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1821–22, 1845 (1992). For discussions of the 
influence of “classical school” scholars such as Bentham and Becarria, see for example 
Edward M. Wise, Foreword: The International Association of Penal Law and the Problem 
of Organized Crime, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1281, 1287–89 (1998). 
214 See COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS: BECARRIA, 
BENTHAM, AND ROMILLY 295–97 (Patterson Smith Publ’g Corp. 1970) (1923) (noting that 
Romilly viewed incapacitation as one of the three legitimate functions of criminal 
punishment). 
215 Alexander Robertson, Crimes and Punishments, 16 LAW MAG. & REV. 95, 99 
(1891) (“[T]he chief end of punishment is to punish the criminal by preventing him from 
doing the like again . . . .”); On the Punishment of Death,. 4 JURIST OR Q.J. JURISPRUDENCE 
& LEGIS. 44, 46 (1833) (“The end of punishment is prevention: prevention in two ways: we 
desire by its example to check society at large; and, by remembrance of it, to reform, or, 
through physical incapability, to restrain the criminal himself.”). 
216 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 83 
(1883) (emphasis added). 
217 The phrase “traditional aims” first appeared in Mendoza-Martinez in 1963. See 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). 
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historical support.218 In the eighteenth century, at least, retribution was not 
considered a legitimate goal of human punishment, but incapacitation was. While 
incapacitation has assumed a growing role in the criminal law in recent decades, 
for centuries it has been recognized as an important purpose of criminal 
punishment. The Court’s repeated suggestion that deterrence and retribution were 
the only two “traditional” goals of punishment is false. It should no longer serve to 
define the boundary between civil and criminal law. 
 
D.  A Revised Doctrine 
 
The recognition that incapacitation is a core function of the criminal law 
mandates a revision of the Mendoza multi-factor test. It can no longer be 
maintained that the regimes of preventive detention are necessarily or even 
generally civil in nature. A regime of preventive detention may be criminal or it 
may be civil. The fact that a law has a primary goal of incapacitation tells us little 
or nothing about whether the law should be classified as “civil” or “criminal.” 
There are at least two ways that the Mendoza test could be sensibly modified 
to account for the reality of incapacitation in the criminal law. First, the fourth 
factor could simply be removed from the Mendoza test, leaving the remaining six 
factors to control the analysis. 
Second, in the alternative, a more nuanced application of the fourth factor 
could recognize that there are different types of incapacitation—some criminal and 
some civil. Paradigmatically civil forms of incapacitation, including everything 
from routine guardianships to more robust full commitments of the mentally ill, are 
often designed in large part to enable the individual to receive treatment, or to 
prevent the individual from harming himself. By contrast, when the criminal law 
incapacitates an individual, its primary goal is to prevent the individual from 
harming others. The fourth Mendoza factor could be modified to ask what type of 
preventive detention the statutory regime creates.219 If the primary goal is 
preventing harm to others (that is, future crimes), then the fourth factor would cut 
in favor of a finding that the statute is criminal. If the primary goal is treatment and 
                                                 
218 In support of its claim that retribution and deterrence were the “traditional aims of 
punishment,” the Mendoza-Martinez Court cited two earlier opinions: Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86 (1958), and United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935). Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–70. Both cases involved at least tangential questions about the 
distinction between “civil” and “criminal” laws, but neither involved any historical 
discussion of the “traditional aims” of criminal punishment. See Trop, 356 U.S. 86 passim; 
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 passim. 
219 Distinguishing various incapacitating regimes this way would not involve as much 
need to divine legislative “purpose.” Application of the doctrine would depend instead on 
the actual operation of the incapacitating system. For example, if the imposition of 
deprivation were actually triggered by a finding of danger to self, the law would be civil, 
whereas if the imposition were actually triggered by a finding of danger to others, the law 
would be criminal. 
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prevention of self-harm, then the fourth factor would cut in favor of finding that 
the statute is civil. 
The first alternative would be simpler to apply, while the second alternative 
would be more difficult to apply, but more analytically robust. Either alternative 
would be better than the current test, which falsely assumes that incapacitation is 
solely a civil function. 
Admittedly, however, neither of these revisions would necessarily mandate a 
different result in any given case. The current doctrine is overdetermined. Even 
with the fourth factor altered, the balance of the test could remain unchanged. Even 
if the Supreme Court recognized incapacitation as criminal, it could continue to 
insist that legislatures have substantial power to make a law civil just by labeling it 
so. The Court could likewise continue to find in any given case that the remaining 
factors support a finding that a statute is civil even though it is aimed at 
incapacitation. Multi-factor tests are usually fluid enough to accommodate 
different results in any given case,220 and the Mendoza test would remain fluid 
even with the fourth factor excised or altered. 
Nonetheless, revising the test might tip the scales in at least some cases. 
Under a revised test, it would be much more difficult to maintain that the indefinite 
incarceration of sex offenders is civil rather than criminal. The first, second, and 
fifth factors weigh in favor of finding such statutes criminal. 
Of course, to say that commitment of sex offenders is “criminal” is not to say 
that the state has no power to order such commitments. It would simply mean that 
individuals could not be committed without being afforded the panoply of 
enhanced procedural protections provided by the Constitution. For instance, an 
individual contesting commitment would have the right to remain silent,221 the 
right to appointed counsel, and the right to a jury trial.222 The facts necessary for 
commitment would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 223 rather than by 
some lower standard, such as “clear and convincing evidence.”224 In short, the 
basic procedural rights of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would apply to 
proceedings to commit sex offenders. 
                                                 
220 See Easterbrook, supra note 186, at 780. 
221 The Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not exist in 
civil proceedings. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986). 
222 See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 6, at 777–78 (discussing some of the constitutional 
protections for criminal defendants that currently “are not required, and thus very rarely 
employed, in civil cases”). 
223 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that due process in criminal 
cases requires that guilt be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
224 This lower standard is currently all that is required in civil commitment 
proceedings. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that due 
process only requires a “clear and convincing” standard in cases of civil commitment). 
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Whether and how the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses would 
apply to criminal commitment regimes is a much thornier question.225 These 
provisions apply more easily to criminal laws whose enforcement focuses solely 
on proof of past acts. In a purely prospective commitment regime—one triggered 
only by a finding of future dangerousness, without a requisite finding of past 
crimes—it would be difficult or impossible to apply the Double Jeopardy and Ex 
Post Facto Clauses in any coherent way. But in the real world, commitment 
statutes typically require both the proof of some past crimes and also proof of 
future dangerousness. Because proof of past crimes is a necessary finding, actual 
commitment statutes function as a sort of extended sentencing provision—like 
reverse-parole. 
Once again, conceiving of commitment as reverse-parole would preserve the 
state’s ability to engage in commitment, subject to additional constitutional 
requirements. Commitment regimes could have only prospective application under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the commitment would at least have to be authorized 
(if not actually imposed) at the time of initial sentencing, in the manner of an 
indeterminate sentence. In short, the particular result of a case like Kansas v. 
Hendricks226 could not stand, but the state’s basic power to detain sexually 
dangerous persons would remain. 
Many traditionalists argue for a strict separation of the criminal and civil 
spheres—they argue that the criminal law should not be used for preventive 
detention.227 Whatever the merits of those arguments, the fact remains that as a 
descriptive matter, criminal law today is based, to a large and growing extent, on 
preventive detention. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence cannot continue to rely 
on descriptive claims about a world that no longer exists, and probably never did. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
A new criminal law has emerged in the last quarter century. The dominant 
goal of the new criminal law is preventive detention—incarceration to incapacitate 
dangerous persons. The emergence of the new criminal law has remade both 
sentencing law and definitions of crimes themselves. The new criminal law has 
also begun to remake the law of evidence. As incapacitation has become an 
accepted goal of criminal punishment, the rationale of the character rule has 
become less compelling, and the rule itself has begun to wane in criminal practice. 
These changes have been subtle, but they have also been both radical and 
fairly rapid. There is no indication that the law will reverse course. Indeed, the 
law’s response to the threat of terrorism has only accelerated the move toward the 
                                                 
225 Cf. Cheh, supra note 165, at 1370–73 (arguing that the applicability of pure 
procedural rights should differ from the applicability of the “substantive” rights, including 
double jeopardy). 
226 521 U.S. 346, 395–96 (2007). 
227 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventative 
Detention, 76 B.U. L. REV. 113, 116–22 (1996); Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil 
Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1996). 
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new criminal law. In coming years, the Supreme Court will be forced to address a 
variety of difficult constitutional questions that the new criminal law presents. 
Ironically, the safest solution may be to embrace preventive detention as an 
accepted function of the criminal law. Doing so would alter the Supreme Court 
doctrines which distinguish the civil from the criminal—doctrines that limit the 
reach of the Bill of Rights. The procedural protections guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights should be extended to more citizens faced with incarceration regardless of 
whether the purpose of incarceration is incapacitation rather than punishment or 
deterrence. As the new criminal law remakes the American justice system, the 
Court must recognize that preventive detention is now a core function of the 
criminal law. That recognition will have the counterintuitive effect of expanding 
the constitutional protections given to citizens facing imprisonment. 
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Alabama ALA. CODE § 
13A-5-9 
(2005). 






Three Strikes: For 
a Class A felony 
with two previous 
Class A 
convictions: life 
imprisonment or a 
term not less than 
99 years. Four 
Strikes: For a 
Class A felony 
with three previous 
convictions: if no 
prior conviction 





parole (at the 
discretion of the 
trial court); if one 
of the prior 
convictions was for 









1978 2 or 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For 
murder in the first 
degree: 99 years (if 
(a) uniformed 





murder in the first 
or second degree, 
(c) victim was 
tortured, (d) 
convicted of 
murder and of 
personally causing 
death of person 
during robbery, or 
(e) used authority 
as peace officer to 
facilitate murder).  
Three Strikes: For 
2010] NEW CRIMINAL LAW 761 
sexual assault in 
the first, second or 
third degree: 99 
years (if defendant 
has two prior 
convictions for 
sexual felonies). 




1993 3 No judicial 
discretion. 








(no possible parole 
until 25 years have 
been served or the 
sentence is 
commuted). 
Arkansas ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-4-
501 (2005 & 
Supp. 2007). 








40-80 years, or life 
imprisonment. Not 
eligible for parole 
or community 
correction transfer 
until they reach the 
age of 55. Three 





years to life, 30 to 
60 years, 25 to 40 
years, 20 to 40 
years, and a term 
of not more than 
three times the 
maximum sentence 
for the unclassified 
offense. Not 
eligible for parole 
or community 
correction transfer 
until they reach the 
age of 55.  
762 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
California CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 667 
(West 2010). 






greater of three 
times the terms of 
imprisonment for 
each felony count, 
25 years, or the 



















eligible for parole 
after 40 years. 














court may not 
accept any plea 
of guilty, not 







whether or not 
the defendant 
has been twice 
convicted and 
imprisoned. 








times the minimum 
term for crime, up 
to 40 years. Three 




times the minimum 
term for crime, up 
to life 
imprisonment. 
Delaware DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 4214 
(2007). 







Three Strikes: For 
conviction a 
specific felony: life 
imprisonment 
without possibility 
of parole or 
probation, unless 
capital punishment 
is the mandatory 
sentence. Four 
Strikes. Up to life 
imprisonment. 
2010] NEW CRIMINAL LAW 763 
District of 
Columbia 








sentence “as it 
deems 
necessary.” 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
felony, with two 
previous felony 
convictions: up to 
30 years. For 
conviction of a 
crime of violence, 
with two previous 
convictions for 
crimes of violence: 









1971 3 or 4 Limited 
discretion. The 
court has some 
discretion if “it 
is not necessary 
for the 






















Depending on the 
severity of the 
crime, for a “three-
time violent felony 
offender”: 
minimum of 5 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment. 
Four Strikes: 
Depending on the 
severity of the 
crime for a “violent 
career criminal”: 
minimum of 10 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment. 













Two Strikes: For 





(unless sentence is 
for capital 
punishment). For 
conviction of a 
“felony”: longest 
possible period of 
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time for the 
offense. 
Hawaii 2006 Haw. 
Sess. Laws, 
ch. 81, § 1. 




apply only if the 
prosecuting 
attorney brings 
before the court 
a motion to 
sentence under 
this section that 
allows the court 
to advise the 
defendant of the 
defendant's 
eligibility for 
sentencing . . . .” 
Three Strikes: For 
a “habitual violent 
felon”: minimum 
of 30 years, 
maximum of life 
imprisonment. 
Idaho IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-
2514 (2004). 
1923 3 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted. 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
third felony (a 
“persistent violator 
of the law”): 
minimum of 5 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment. 





















convicted of a 
“sex offense 
against a child.” 
Three Strikes: For 
a “habitual 
offender”: not 
more than three 
times the sentence 
for the underlying 
offense. For 
conviction of “sex 
offense against a 
child”: possible life 
imprisonment 
without parole. 






1976 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: For 
a “habitual 
offender” 
convicted of a third 
Class “C” or “D” 
felony: not eligible 
for parole for three 
years. 
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1969 2 or 3 Limited judicial 
discretion. The 
bottom and top 






Two Strikes: For 









of not less than the 
least nor more than 
twice the greatest 
minimum sentence; 
maximum of not 
less than the least 
nor more than 




conviction of a 
third specified 
felony (see above): 
minimum of three 
times the greatest 
minimum; 
maximum of three 
times the 
maximum sentence 
available. If the 
third felony is one 
not specified, it 
would follow the 
sentencing pattern 
above for two 
strikes. 






1974 2 or 3 Limited judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For a 
“Persistent felony 
offender in the 
second degree”: 
indeterminate term 
for the next highest 
degree than the 
offense of 
conviction. Three 
Strikes: For a 
“Persistent felony 
offender in the first 
degree”: 20 to 50 
years, or life 
imprisonment. For 
a sex crime against 
a minor: life 
without parole for 
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25 years. 





1956 3 or 4 Limited judicial 
discretion. The 
district court has 
authority to 
reduce any part 
of a mandatory 
minimum 
sentence when 
such a term 







State v. Pollard, 
644 So. 2d 370, 













sentences for prior 
convictions). Both 
Three & Four 
Strike rules 
stipulate that two 
of the previous 
felonies are “a 
crime of violence.” 
Maine ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 17-
A, § 1252 
(2006 & 
Supp. 2006). 




“must be given 
serious 
consideration by 
the court when 
imposing a 
sentence.” 
Three Strikes: For 
a crime, other than 





sentencing class is 
one class higher 
than it would be 
otherwise. 






Supp. 2009).  
1957 3 or 4 No judicial 
discretion. 
Statute says the 
sentence is 
“mandatory,” 
for four strikes, 
and “the court 
may not suspend 
all or part of the 
mandatory 25-
year sentence,” 
for three strikes. 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
crime of violence 
on two separate 
occasions (with at 
least one previous 
term of 
confinement): 
minimum of 25 
years. Four 
Strikes: For three 
separate terms of 
confinement for 
three separate 
convictions of any 
crime of violence: 
life imprisonment 
without parole. 
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Massachusetts MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 





3 No judicial 
discretion. 





convicted, and has 
served at least 
three years in 
prison): maximum 
term provided by 
law for the felony 
for which he or she 
is sentenced. 







1927 4 Limited judicial 
discretion. The 
bottom and top 






Four Strikes: For 
conviction of an 
offense punishable 
by a maximum of 5 
years: life 
imprisonment or a 
lesser term. For 
conviction of an 
offense punishable 
by a maximum 
term that is less 
than 5 years: 
maximum term of 
not more than 15 
years. 




1998; 2005 3 or 6 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted in 




Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
third violent crime: 
judge may impose 
an aggravated 
durational 
departure from the 
presumptive 
imprisonment 
sentence up to the 
statutory maximum 
sentence. For 
conviction of a 
third violent 
felony: court must 
impose a sentence 
of at least the 
presumptive 
sentence under the 
Sentencing 
Guidelines (and 
defendant is not 
eligible for parole, 
probation, 
discharge or work 
release). Six 
Strikes: For 
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conviction of a 
sixth felony: court 
may impose an 
aggravated 
durational 
departure up to the 
statutory maximum 
sentence if the 
present offense 
“was committed as 
part of a pattern of 
criminal conduct.”  




1976 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
felony, with two 
previous felonies 
or federal crimes 
involving a 
sentence of one 
year or more: 
maximum term 
prescribed for such 
felony (not eligible 
for sentence 
reduction or 
suspension, nor is 
defendant eligible 
for parole or 
probation). For 
conviction of a 
“crime of 
violence,” with two 
previous felonies 
as described above: 
life imprisonment 
(not eligible for 
sentence reduction 
or suspension, nor 
is defendant 
eligible for parole 
or probation).  
2010] NEW CRIMINAL LAW 769 






1977  3 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted. 
“Class” of the 
offense is given 
as a range, but 
specific 
sentence length 
does not appear 
in the statute. 
Three Strikes: For 
a “persistent 
offender” (two or 
more prior 







commission of a 
felony): sentence 
will rise to the next 
class (Class B to 
Class A), or remain 
as is (Class A to 
Class A). 




1995 2 or 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: Life 
imprisonment, 
unless the death 
penalty is imposed 
(strict guidelines 
provide for 
possible parole, but 
obtaining parole is 
unlikely). 





1921 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: 





minimum of 10 
years, maximum of 
60 years. With two 
prior felony 
convictions where 
at least one of the 
felonies was a 
serious crime (as 
defined by the 
statute): mandatory 
minimum of 25 
years, maximum of 
60 years. 
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1911 3 Some judicial 
discretion. For a 
“habitual 
criminal,” the 
trial judge may 
dismiss a count 
included in the 
indictment. For 
a “habitual 
felon,” the trial 
judge may not 
dismiss a count.  
Three Strikes: 
With two previous 
felony convictions: 
sentenced as a 
category B felon, 
imprisoned for a 
minimum of 5 
years, maximum of 
20 years. With 
three previous 
felony convictions: 
imprisoned for (1) 
life without the 
possibility of 
parole, (2) life with 
possible parole in 
10 years, or (3) 25 
years with 
eligibility for 
parole in 10 years. 
With two previous 
felony convictions 
that fall into the 
category defined 
by statute: either 
(1) life without 
possibility of 
parole, (2) life with 
possibility of 
parole in 10 years, 
or (3) 25 years with 
eligibility for 














in the statute. 
Three Strikes: 
With two previous 
felony convictions: 
may be sentenced 
to an “extended 
term of 
imprisonment.” For 
a felony, other than 
murder or 
manslaughter: 
minimum of 10 
years, maximum of 
30 years. For two 
or more offenses of 
aggravated 
felonious sexual 
assault: life without 
parole. For a third 
felonious sexual 
assault offense: life 
imprisonment. 
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1994 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: For 
a third conviction 
for a violent 
felony: punishment 
imposed by that 
conviction, in 
addition to life 
imprisonment with 
the possibility of 
parole. 
New York N.Y. PENAL 





1978 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: For 
a “persistent 
violent felony 
offender,” with two 
or more predicate 
violent felony 
convictions: 
minimum of 25 








1994 3 No judicial 
discretion at 
sentence. The 












1973 3 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted.  
Three Strikes: For 
convictin of a 
Class A felony, if 
defendant is proven 
to be a “dangerous 
special offender” 
or a “habitual 
offender” (two or 
more felonies): 
maximum of life 
imprisonment. 
Ohio OHIO REV. 












purposes of felony 
sentencing. “The 
overriding 
purposes of felony 
sentencing are to 
protect the public 
from future crime 
by the offender and 
others and to 
punish the 
offender. To 








the offender and 





to the victim of the 
offense, the public, 
or both.” 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 21, § 
51.1 (2002). 








seek to enhance 
punishment. 
Two Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
violent offense that 
normally has a 5 
year sentence: 
mandatory 
minimum of 10 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment. 
For conviction of a 
nonviolent crime 
punishable by a 5 
year or longer 
sentence: minimum 
of twice the normal 
minimum sentence, 
maximum of life 
imprisonment. 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
violent offense, 
with two previous 
felony convictions: 
minimum of 20 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment. 
For conviction of a 
nonviolent crime, 
with two previous 
felony convictions: 
minimum of three 
times the normal 
minimum, 
maximum of life 
imprisonment.  
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1971 2 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For 
“dangerous 
offenders” (1) 
convicted of Class 
A felony and 




toward crimes that 
seriously endanger 
the life or safety of 
another;” 2) 
convicted of felony 
that endangers life 
of another and a 
previous felony 
conviction; 3) 





conduct,” and “is 




toward crimes that 
seriously endanger 




sentence, with a 
maximum of 30 
years. 




1982 3 Limited judicial 
discretion. If 
court finds 25 
years is not 
sufficient, it 
may increase 
sentence to life 
imprisonment 
without parole. 
Court may not 
give sentence 
less than 25 
years. 
Three Strikes: 
Minimum of 25 
years, maximum of 
life imprisonment 
without parole. 
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1896 3 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted, with 





seek to enhance 
punishment. 
Three Strikes: 
With two or more 












1982 2 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For a 
“serious offense”: 
life without parole.  





1939 2 or 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: With 
one or two 
previous felonies: 
sentence shall be 
enhanced to the 




With three or more 
prior felonies, and 
one or more of the 
prior felonies was a 
crime of violence: 
life imprisonment 
with a possible 
$50,000 fine. For 
three or more prior 
felonies, but with 
no previous crimes 
of violence: 
maximum of life 
imprisonment, but 
eligible for parole 
eligible if sentence 
is less than life 
imprisonment. 
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1994 2 or 3 The judge may 




a defendant with 
a sufficient 
number of prior 
convictions be 
sentenced as a 
repeat violent 
offender. If the 
judge denies the 
plea agreement, 
the DA may still 
amend the 
offense to an 
offense that is 
not designated 






Texas TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 
12.42 (West 
Supp. 2010). 




The statute does 
not address the 
issue of probation 
or parole. 








Parole may look 
at “habitual 
violent offender 








degree of second- 
and third-degree 
felony convictions 
to a first-degree 
felony. 
Vermont VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, 
§§ 11, 11a 
(1998). 
1949 3 or 4 Judicial 
discretion 
permitted. 
Three Strikes: For 
a third conviction, 
with two previous 
felony convictions 
for crimes of 
violence: may be 
sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
Four Strikes: For 
a fourth conviction, 
with three previous 
felony convictions: 
may be sentenced 
to life 
imprisonment. 
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1994 3 No judicial 
discretion. The 
State is not 
mandated to 
prosecute under 
this statute.  
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
third act of 
violence, with 
previous 
convictions for two 
or more separate 
acts of violence: 
life imprisonment 
without parole. 













1849 2 or 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For a 
conviction of first 
degree murder, 
second degree 
murder, or sexual 
assault in the first 
degree, with a 
previous 
conviction for 






Strikes: With two 
prior convictions 
for a crime 
punishable by 
confinement in a 
penitentiary: life 
imprisonment. 





1955 2 or 3 No judicial 
discretion. 
Two Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
serious child sex 
offense, with a 
conviction for the 
same on at least 







convictions for a 








Wyoming WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-10-
201 (2009). 
1982 3 or 4 No judicial 
discretion. 
Three Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
violent felony, with 
two or more 
previous felony 
convictions: 
minimum of 10 
years, maximum of 
50 years. Four 
Strikes: For 
conviction of a 
violent felony, with 
three or more 
previous 
convictions: life 
imprisonment. 
 
